ABSTRACT We present an electrocardiogram (ECG)-based data encryption (EDE) scheme for implantable medical devices (IMDs). IMDs, including pacemakers and cardiac defibrillators, perform therapeutic or even life-saving functions and store sensitive data; therefore, it is important to prevent adversaries from having access to them. The EDE is designed with the ability to provide information-theoretically unbreakable encryption where two well-known techniques of classic one-time pads (OTPs) and error correcting codes are combined to achieve a cryptographic primitive for IMDs. Unlike other ECG-based key agreement schemes where ECG features are used to facilitate a key distribution, in the EDE scheme, random binary strings generated from ECG signals are directly used as keys for encryption. OTP keys are generated by the IMD and the programmer, respectively, before each encryption attempt; thus, the EDE does not require a cryptographic infrastructure to support a key distribution, storage, revocation, and refreshment. Protected by the EDE, IMDs could not be accessed by adversaries; however, medical personnel can have access to them by measuring real-time ECG data in emergencies. Therefore, the EDE design achieves a balance of high security and high accessibility for the IMD. Our data and security analysis shows that the EDE is a viable scheme for protecting IMDs.
previous work on the IMD security which focused on the ECG-based key distribution between the IMD and the programmer [13] , [14] . Initially, an IMD and a programmer record electrocardiogram (ECG) signals synchronously from two parts of a patient's body (e.g., the heart and the wrist) and generate two highly matching binary keys from these two signals, respectively. The IMD encrypts its secret data with one key before transmission; a programmer, after receiving the ciphertext, decrypts the secret data using another synchronously generated key.
The EDE implements a simple security policy for IMDs which we call ''touch-decipher'': a programmer has an ability to decrypt the ciphertext if and only if it has a significant physical contact with the patient's body. This robustness property is decided by properties of generated ECG keys, such as randomness, temporal variance and distinctiveness among individuals. The decryption capability would be disabled once the programmer loses physical contact with the patient. This touch-decipher policy balances the conflicting requirements of security and accessibility. Emergency medical responders can gain access to the IMD by making a physical contact with the patient's body while adversary's access is to be prevented without access to real-time ECG data.
We design an information-theoretically secure encryption method for IMDs. IMDs normally perform therapeutic or even life-saving functions for patients; attacks to IMDs could cause fatal consequences. That is why IMDs have to be rigorously protected from adversaries. Considering that One-Time Pads (OTPs), as proven by Shannon [16] , are information-theoretically secure, the EDE scheme using modified OTPs can rigorously protect IMDs from adversaries deciphering messages.
The EDE scheme is based on physiological signal-based OTPs which uses binary strings generated from ECG as keys for direct encryption. OTPs were widely used for covert communications by intelligence agencies during the World War II and the Cold War. Recently the OTP concept was applied in quantum [17] and optical scattering [18] based cryptography. Recent research on ECG-based key agreement, proposed in [19] [20] [21] [22] , establishes a symmetric random key between two sensors where ECG signals are used to conceal the key in distribution. Unlike these schemes, security keys in our scheme are generated from ECG signals and are used to encrypt secret data directly. Compared to traditional symmetric key-based encryption systems, the EDE has the following advantages:
• The EDE scheme combines two well-known techniques of classic One-Time Pads and Error Correcting Codes to achieve a cryptographic primitive for IMDs. It inherits the property of perfect secrecy from OTPs, and even has an ability to resist brute-force attacks.
• The EDE scheme does not require a cryptographic infrastructure to support key pre-distribution, storage, revocation and refreshment. This is because OTP keys are generated from ECG signals by each sensor dynamically before each round of encryption. The EDE scheme does not need to protect random seeds either since ECG is used as a natural random source to generate keys. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review threat models of the IMD system and the ECG signal model; in Section III, we propose an architecture within which the EDE scheme can be implemented. Section IV is devoted to algorithms of the EDE scheme, including Error Correcting Codes, modified OTPs, ECG signal processing and communication protocols, while Section V presents a comprehensive evaluation of the scheme on aspects of OTP key features, FAR/FRR performance and overhead. We analyze the security of the scheme in Section VI and review the related work in Section VII. The final section provides a summary of our contributions.
II. SYSTEM MODELLING
In this section, adversarial and operational models, as well as ECG signal models are presented before detailing the EDE scheme.
A. THREAT MODELLING AND ASSUMPTIONS
Proper threat modelling is a vital aspect of security design [23] . IMDs communicate with an external device called a programmer infrequently. A wireless session with the IMD is initiated by the programmer during which the private data in the IMD are shared with or the parameters of the IMD are modified by the programmer. According to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requirement, the IMD normally does not initiate a session [24] .
The analysis presented in [23] discusses two main classes of adversaries:
1) PASSIVE EAVESDROPPERS
A passive eavesdropper listens to an IMD's wireless transmissions and tries to capture and decode transmitted data with off-the-shelf or custom-built radio equipment. It does not interfere with the IMD's communications. Some recent studies have demonstrated that this kind of attack could compromise privacy and confidentiality of patient's data [1] , [8] .
2) ACTIVE ADVERSARIES
An active adversary extends the eavesdropper's capabilities and has the ability to replay recorded control commands, or generate new radio commands, to an IMD, aiming at triggering data transmission from the IMD or modifying the IMD's settings. Halperin et al. [8] demonstrated that an active attacker could control IMDs by replaying messages which may even cause fatal heart attacks to patients while Li et al. [1] showed that the insulin pump could also be controlled by this kind of adversaries.
We assume that the adversaries cannot measure real-time ECG signals from a patient; however, they could use historical ECG from the patient to attack this security scheme. As measuring ECG signals requires a physical contact with the patient's body, the attack would be detected by the patient immediately; moreover, physical attacks could be launched on the patient's body if an adversary has the ability to make a physical contact with the patient. We also assume that medical personnel are trustworthy and hospitals provide a safe environment. This is reasonable as government regulatory agencies will oversee the conduct of doctors in hospital settings.
B. ECG MODELLING
We extract random keys from ECG signals for encryption. An example of consecutive ECG signals is shown in Fig. 1 . One ECG trace includes three major waves: P wave, QRS complex and T wave [25] . The P wave represents the depolarization impulse of the atria; QRS complex represents the ventricular depolarization while the T wave represents the ventricles repolarization. As the R-peak is the most prominent feature of the ECG waveform, it can be used to represent a heartbeat; two consecutive R peaks, shown in Fig. 1 , is the heartbeat duration and referred to as the Inter-PulseInterval (IPI). Suppose t R (i) is the timing of the i th R peak, then IPI i = t R(i) −t R(i−1) . Random OTP keys can be extracted from IPIs because of their well-studied chaotic nature [26] . As the ECG waveform has long-term trends and short-term chaotic variations, the keys are generated from residual signals which are formed by eliminating the long-term trends in the ECG waveform.
In the EDE, OTP keys are generated from synchronously sampled ECG signals in the IMD and the programmer respectively. Fig. 1 also shows an example of two synchronously measured ECG signals. These two signals are from the same signal source, that is, heartbeats, so, they have a major part in common; a minor difference between them is caused by measurement errors from instruments and other factors. If we denote a binary string generated from the IMD as an OTP key, k ai , and that from the programmer as k bi , a mismatch between k ai and k bi could be regarded as bit errors of the key.
III. EDE SCHEME ARCHITECTURE
The EDE scheme includes two components: an IMD and an external programmer. The IMD is an electronic device which FIGURE 2. Secure communications with the EDE scheme. The IMD and the programmer measure ECG signals from the heart and the wrist simultaneously on the same patient; before sending the secret data to the programmer, the data is encrypted with ECG signals in the IMD.
is implanted in the body to assist and/or monitor a patient's health, while the programmer is an outside device which has the ability to access data in the IMD and program it wirelessly. Both of them are currently standard medical devices and most IMDs have the capability of measuring ECG signals [10] . In our scheme, an ECG sensor is connected to the programmer and measures ECG signals from, for example, the wrist of the patient, as shown in Fig. 2 . It is convenient to add an ECG measuring function into the programmer since it is an outside device and is normally kept in a hospital.
The scheme is depicted in Fig. 2 . It can be seen that the IMD and the programmer measure ECG synchronously and random binary key sets, K A = {k ai } and K B = {k bi }, are then generated by each device respectively. K A is used to encrypt secret data with modified OTPs in the IMD while K B is used to decrypt the ciphertext. Since there is a mismatch between K A and K B which could be regarded as the bit errors of the keys, error correcting codes (ECC) are employed to correct these errors within the decrypted message.
One key feature of the EDE is that the keys are independently generated by each device. The EDE does not require key distribution or transmission from one sensor to another. Key refreshment can be easily achieved by generating keys at two sensors directly. Also there is no need of key storage and revocation, since a fresh pair of keys, k ai and k bi , will be generated before each new encryption cycle and will not be re-used according to OTP rules.
Another key feature is that the EDE scheme inherits the property of perfect secrecy from OTPs, and can provide information-theoretically secure encryption for IMDs. As IMDs normally perform therapeutic or life-saving functions, this feature is critical to IMD security. Inherent characteristics of ECG bit strings of randomness, temporal variance and distinctiveness ensure that OPT keys cannot be probed, duplicated or speculated without a physical contact with the patient's body.
IV. ECG-BASED DATA ENCRYPTION SCHEME
One-Time Pads (OTPs), although acknowledged as mathematically unbreakable, have limited applications in VOLUME 3, 2015 the modern computing era [17] , [18] . This is because the OTPs require the storage of a large number of random keys and guarantee that no keys are re-used. The EDE scheme applies a practical and secure approximation of OTPs for the IMD system where the OTP keys are generated by the sender and the receiver respectively and synchronously. This section presents the EDE scheme in detail. We first design a modified OTP algorithm for IMD encryption and then propose a protocol which executes the EDE scheme with this algorithm.
A. LINEAR ERROR-CORRECTING CODES
We design a system with a secret s in the secret space S, an encryption algorithm F Enc and its corresponding decryption pair F Dec . Considering the mismatch between K A and K B , our designed EDE algorithm has to satisfy the following: 
is with an overwhelming probability.
This requires that the EDE scheme has the capability to correct errors caused by the key pair mismatch between (k ai , k bi ). Here the overwhelming probability is that it is larger than 1 − ε for certain negligible value ε. Borrowing design ideas from the area of fuzzy vault [27] , fuzzy commitment [28] and fuzzy extractor [29] , an Error Correcting Code (ECC) is introduced into the scheme without impacting protocol security.
We denote a binary linear ECC (n e , k e , t e ) with error correcting capability t e , where n e is the length of the codeword C e and k e the message length. The ECC encoding function, encoderECC(.), maps the message s ∈ {0, 1} k e into its codeword s e ∈ {0, 1} n e . According to the ECC linear property an XOR operation of any two codewords leads to another codeword within the same codeword set. Here we use the Hamming distance to measure the distance of codewords, denoted by d H {., .} and the Hamming weight is denoted by . . For an ECC with error correcting capability t e , the minimum distance of codewords is d H = 2t e + 1.
Given an ECC encoded message s e ∈ {0, 1} n e , the minimum distance to any codeword c e ∈ C e is defined as d min (s e , c e ) = min c e ∈C e d H (s e , c e ). If d min (s e , c e ) ≤ t e the ECC decoding function, decoderECC(.), returns the message corresponding to the closest codeword within C e . Otherwise, this encoded message is not decodable. A classic class of cyclic ECC called BCH codes is chosen in our design. The principal advantage of BCH codes is that they can be decoded with a small and low-powered electronic hardware [30] , such as the wireless sensor nodes.
B. MODIFIED ONE-TIME PAD ALGORITHM
For classical OTPs working over a secret s i in the secret space S, a corresponding key k i in the key space K , the resulted cryptogram c i in the cryptogram space C is denoted by
where f is a function with a unique inverse f −1 and ⊕ is an XOR operation which mixes each bit of s i with each bit of k i . Thereafter, c i is to be sent through a public channel. At the receiving end, the same OTP key k i is applied to decrypt the secret s i by
Here F denotes the implementation of f on each element of S while F −1 is its inverse f −1 on each element of M c . OTPs become unbreakable only when the used keys are kept secret, truly random, never re-used in whole or part and the same length as the message.
Because of the uncertainty of physiological (ECG) signals, the requirement in Definition 1 has to be satisfied. Thus, the classical OTPs are modified as follows: (a) Encryption process F Enc . A series of secrets S are mapped to ECC codewords S e by S e = encoderECC(S) at the beginning where redundant information is added to correct errors caused by key bit mismatches. Then OTP operations are performed on S e to encrypt the secrets by
. S e is slightly different from S e due to bit errors between K A and K B . In order to correct these error bits, ECC decoding process is performed by S = decoderECC(S e ) where S is the output of the modified OTPs. In order to ensure that S equals S, the hash value of S, hash(S), is sent to the receiver along with the cryptogram M c . Hence the receiver computes the hash value hash(S ) with the same hash function as the sender and compares it with the received hash(S). The modified OTP scheme succeeds if they are equal; otherwise it fails and the output S is discarded. Within this modified OTP scheme, the length of the key has to be as long as the ECC codeword, not the secret, since the ECC codeword is XORed with the key.
Lemma 1: For ∀k bi ∈ K B , the decryption process F Dec succeeds when the number of key bit errors is less than or equal to ECC error correction capability, denoted by
The largest error tolerance of the scheme equals the ECC error correction capability t e .
Proof: In the i th OTP encryption, the cryptogram
is the ECC encoding output. In the decryption process, 3 depicts a comparison of the classical OTPs and the EDE scheme within which the technique of OTPs is combined with the ECC to fulfill the transmission of the secret s i . In classical OTPs, key pre-distribution is critical but involves high risk. The same copy of a key set has to be distributed securely to the sender as well as the receiver for successful decryption. However, the EDE scheme generates keys by extracting binary strings from ECG signals directly, as shown in Fig. 3 part (b) . The sender (IMD) and the receiver (programmer) generate binary strings, k ai and k bi , from simultaneously measured ECG signal; thus the EDE scheme does not require key pre-deployment or transmission.
C. OTP KEY GENERATION
The fundamental and critical part of the EDE scheme is to generate pairs of ECG Binary Strings (BSs) (k ai and k bi ) synchronously satisfying two basic requirements: randomness and low mismatch rate. ECG IPIs computed from the same ECG signal measured at different parts of the body by two sensors are not completely identical. Bao et al. [31] propose an ECG BS algorithm in which whole IPI values are used in quantization; but later research [12] shows that using all the bits of each IPI would reduce the entropy of generated BSs. We propose an improved ECG BS generation algorithm based on the scheme of Bao et al. [31] . The algorithm is described in four steps.
Step
[Simple Moving Average (SMA)]:
The SMA is an un-weighted mean of a series of different subsets in the whole data sequence. For this system, the SMA of m consecutive IPIs is given by
where w is the window size. It could be seen that the SMA process keeps the randomness of the current IPI value while it smoothes out the difference ∇IPI i via a cumulativesum method.
Step 2 (Gray Coding): Here we use Gray Code, not common binary code, to quantize IPIs. The most important feature of Gray Code is that there is only one bit difference between two successive values.
Step 3 (LSB Removal): We observed that the Least Significant Bit (LSB) of SMA processed IPIs was normally different. In order to reduce the mismatch rate, the LSB is not used in our scheme.
Step 4 (Parity Check): Bits from two consecutive SMA-processed IPIs at both sides are extracted to form an 8-bit block. Then both sides calculate the parity of their own block and exchange the parity information. If the parity is the same, each side extracts 7 bits of the block and discards the last bit as the parity check leaks one bit of information. This process moves ahead until there are 127 bits on each side.
In order to improve the matching performance, the SMA process is used here to smooth out short-term fluctuations of IPIs at two sensors. This process would, to some extent, reduce the entropy of generated BSs; however, there is a trade-off between the requirements of randomness and low mismatch rate. In practice, a proper selection of the SMA window size can achieve the balance between randomness and matching performance.
D. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL DESIGN
After a programmer initiates a communication session with an IMD, a protocol implementing the EDE scheme is described as follows.
1) ECG BINARY STRING GENERATION
The programmer sends a synchronization request to the IMD for sampling ECG which indicates the sampling start-time T start with a timestamp in the frame. Since there would be a timing difference between two clocks residing in the IMD and the programmer, these two clocks is synchronized by following the IEEE 1588 standard [32] . In the EDE scheme, the programmer is selected as a master while the IMD is a slave. In the synchronization frame, the programmer indicates its current time T current and sends T current to the IMD. Since the IMD is very close to the programmer (less than 1m), the transmission time of this frame is negligible. Therefore, the IMD uses T current to correct its clock. After the clock synchronization, the IMD and the programmer sample ECG signals synchronously at the time T start . Two highly matched and random ECG binary strings, k ai and k bi , are then generated by the IMD and the programmer respectively, using the aforementioned algorithm. We do not require key pre-distribution or transmission here as keys will be generated by each device independently.
2) PROCESS IN THE IMD
After generating k ai , the process executed in the IMD is shown in Algorithm 1. Firstly the secret s i is encoded by an ECC encoding process, encoderECC(.), to create s ei in which VOLUME 3, 2015 Similarly, the encryption protocol for messages from the programmer to the IMD can be done as follows: the programmer initiates and synchronizes the communication session with the IMD at the beginning, which generates two random ECG BSs respectively. After that, the programmer follows the similar process as in Algorithm 1 to encrypt the message while the IMD performs decryption with the similar process as in Algorithm 2. The ack message is sent back in each communication session to inform the programmer of the decryption result of each message.
V. SCHEME EVALUATION
In this section, we provide an evaluation of the EDE scheme by performing a series of experiments. Lacking the ability to obtain IPI measurements from IMDs in the lab, we follow ack ← failure 10: else if 11: Send ack to the IMD a similar analysis as in [19] [20] [21] [22] and generate OTP keys by using the ECG data from the MIT PhysioBank database (http://www.physionet.org/physiobank). Experiments were carried out on the ECG data from 167 subjects: 18 subjects (128Hz, 5 men and 13 women) from the MIT-BIH Normal Sinus Rhythm (NSRDB) [33] , 79 subjects (250Hz, 466Mbit) from European ST-T (EDB) [34] , 47 subjects (360Hz, 107Mbit) from MIT-BIH Arrhythmia (MITDB) [33] and 23 subjects (250Hz, 607Mbit) from MIT-BIH Atrial Fibrillation (AFDB) [33] . Considering potential applications to pacemakers or ICDs, the last two databases (MITDB and AFDB) contain arrhythmia ECG signals. 
A. OTP KEY RANDOMNESS ANALYSIS
Randomness is a vital requirement of using generated ECG binary strings, that is, OTP keys, for security purposes. The EDE scheme relies upon generated ECG BSs following what Shannon defines a purely random process [16] . Our first experiment was to analyze the randomness of captured ECG IPI values. We collected 15, 000 consecutive IPI values and plotted histograms in Fig. 4 
This normal distribution is fundamental to generate random BSs from IPI values.
We then calculate the entropy to measure the uncertainty of generated ECG BSs. For a random variable χ = 0, 1, we can calculate the entropy of each bit sequence using the formula: H (χ ) = −p 0 log 2 p 0 − p 1 log 2 p 1 where p 0 and p 1 are the probability mass functions of 0s and 1s respectively. The largest entropy is 1 when it follows a uniform distribution. The entropy result of bit strings generated from about 100 ECG samples is shown in Fig. 5 . It can be seen that the entropy values of most ECG bit strings were close to 1, with the mean entropy of 0.992. Furthermore, a two-tailed runs test was also performed during the experiment, which showed that more than 95% of ECG bit strings passed the two-tail runs test with a significance level of 5%. Therefore, the generated ECG bit strings have a good performance of randomness.
In order to comprehensively analyze the randomness of generated ECG BSs, we performed an experiment with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) randomness test suite [35] . The quality of randomness of ECG binary strings was statistically evaluated by employing the state-of-the-art NIST test suite [35] which is used for testing random and pseudo-random number generators for cryptography. The outputs are p-values which indicate the probability that the generated BSs are random or not. If the p-value is less than a threshold (normally 1%), the hypothesis that a binary string is random is then rejected.
We used in the test an aggregate of databases of 18 subjects from the NSRDB [33] , 79 subjects from EDB [34] , 47 subjects from MITDB [33] and 23 subjects from AFDB [33] , with test results shown in TABLE 1. Tests which produce multiple p-values are represented by a (+) and followed by the number of different generated values in parenthesis. The table displays their mean values. TABLE I shows that all p-values are greater than 1% (pass). Consequently, the generated ECG BSs are random and can be used in practical OTPs.
B. OTP KEY TEMPORAL VARIANCE
We evaluated generated ECG binary strings for temporal variance to ensure that the encrypted secret cannot be decrypted by the same subject's historical or future ECG signals. In the experiment, we sampled ECG signals on each subject from the MIT-BIH NSRDB over 300 random start-times and computed the average Hamming distance between k ai and k bi . Fig. 6 shows an experiment result from one subject. The x-axis represents k ai of all samples while y-axis represents k bi . Colors represent the range within which the actual Hamming distance falls. The higher values are in red while the lower values are in blue.
FIGURE 6.
Hamming distance between two ECG binary strings generated from two different body parts of the same subject. It shows that the Hamming distance values of two BSs generated at different start-times are quite large ( 49.72% on average) while those of BSs generated at the same time (the diagonal values) are really small (less than 10%).
We can see from Fig. 6 that the Hamming distance values between k ai and k bi generated at two different start-times are quite high, with the average distance of about 49.72% (about 63 bits). This bit error rate was much higher than the error correcting capability of BCH codes; thus the encrypted secret could not be decrypted by ECG signals measured at a different start-time of the same subject. Meanwhile, obtaining correct ECG binary strings via brute-force attack was also impossible in a realistic setting. This is because the adversary has no knowledge as to which of the 127 bits are different; obtaining the correct ECG bit string via brute-force would require 127 63 attempts which are nearly identical to bruteforcing a 127-bit long secret. We also can see from Fig. 6 that all the diagonal values are very small (less than 10%), which means that the Hamming distance between k ai and k bi generated at the same start-time VOLUME 3, 2015 are quite low; therefore, the error bits in the decrypted secret could be corrected by proper ECC.
C. OTP KEY DISTINCTIVENESS
The property of distinctiveness is to ensure that the secret encrypted by an IMD implanted in one subject cannot be decrypted by another programmer using ECG signals from another subject (either accidentally or maliciously). This can distinguish IMD systems on different subjects. In the experiment, we sampled ECG signals on each subject from the MIT-BIH NSRDB over 300 random start-times and computed the average Hamming distance between two ECG binary strings from different subjects. The average distance was 49.99% (about 63 bits) which is similar to that for temporal variance above. This result shows that the secret encrypted by an IMD using ECG signals from one subject cannot be decrypted by another programmer using another subject's ECG signals. This can prevent attackers from decrypting secrets using a different subject's ECG data.
D. FAR/FRR ANALYSIS
False Rejection Rate (FRR) and False Acceptance Rate (FAR) are two critical parameters to be taken into consideration when evaluating any biometric-based security schemes. In our experiment, FRR is the measure of the likelihood that a programmer fails to decrypt a secret from an IMD by using simultaneously measured ECG signals from the same subject, while FAR is the measure of the likelihood that a programmer could decrypt a secret from an IMD by using the same subject's historical or future ECG data or data from another subject. Considering that error correction codes are employed, FRR and FAR will vary according to BCH codes' error correction capability. Fig. 7 shows experiment results of FRR and FAR on each ECG database with BCH code length n = 127. The results of FAR tests on all ECG databases are zero while the FRR test results decline dramatically when the error correction capability t increases, ending at around 5%.
We observe from Fig. 7 that results of FAR tests on all ECG databases are zero, which means the encrypted secret could not be decrypted by either the same subject's historical or future ECG data or ECG measured from other subjects.
These results are consistent with the analysis of temporal variance and distinctiveness. We also see from Fig. 7 that FRR declines dramatically when the error correction capability, t, increases, ending at around 5%. We note that the performance on databases of sinus rhythm ECG (NSRDB and EDB) is better than that on arrhythmia databases (MITDB and AFDB). However, this scheme could be applied for arrhythmia patients as long as QRS peaks of ECG signals can be measured correctly. Generally, from our observation of experiments, the more accurate the ECG IPIs measured the better the FRR performance.
E. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
Communication overhead is negligible in the EDE as the ciphertext sent into the channel is of the same length as the codeword of BCH codes. Adding a large number of chaff points to hide the data [19] , [21] is not needed here as the secret data is already encrypted. The main concern of computation overhead is about the processes within the IMD since it is battery powered and implanted in the body. The programmer, as an external device in the hospital or clinics, could be easily designed with hardware capable of supporting intensive computational overheads. So, we focus on overhead analysis on the IMD.
In the IMD, processes include ECG binary string generation, BCH encoding, hash function and encryption. The encoding process of cyclic BCH codes could be quickly processed by linear feedback shift registers (LFSR). As presented in [10] , SHA-1 hash process is around 4ms on the platform of TelosB with TinyOS 2.1. The encryption process is a simple XOR operation. As discussed in [10] and [31] ECG detection and IPI calculations could be assumed as basic functions for IMDs (e.g., pacemakers).
In the ECG BS generation algorithm, SMA values of m consecutive IPIs are calculated first; since the window size w is a constant, its order of the computational complexity is O(m). For Gray coding, if a binary
It could be seen that Gray coding needs (q − 1) bitwise addition operations for each SMA i . Compared to an addition operation, the bitwise operation is slightly faster; thus its complexity can be assumed as a fraction of an addition, denoted by γ (0 < γ < 1). Thus the total number of bitwise addition operations for Gray coding is O(γ (q − 1) (m − w + 1)) = O(m). The complexity of LSB removal could be easily completed by reading bits except the LSB. Therefore, the order of the computational complexity of the BS generation algorithm is O(m), which shows that it only adds a little complexity to the IMD. The energy overhead due to communications is another important requirement when designing the EDE scheme.
As discussed in [36] , for a CrossBow MICA2DOT mote using a Chipcon CC1000 radio, receiving and transmitting one byte message consume 28.6µJ and 59.2µJ , respectively. For the IMD transmitting and receiving an N -byte message, the energy consumption is 59.2N µJ and 28.6N µJ , respectively. Compared with the fuzzy vault-based scheme [19] , [21] , our EDE scheme does not require any chaff points added into the message; therefore, the energy consumption is much lower than the fuzzy vault-based scheme.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of OTPs relies predominantly on their key management; the EDE communication protocols supporting OTPs also play a key role in their security. This section discusses how the EDE scheme obeys rules of key management in OTPs, the property of perfect secrecy and the protocol security.
A. REQUIREMENTS OF OTP KEYS
According to Shannon's analysis [16] , the protocol of OTPs is information-theoretically unbreakable only if properly applied. The rules for OTP keys are that: (a) the key is as long as the secret message; (b) the key is truly random; (c) each key is used only once and (d) the key is destroyed immediately after use. Requirements of (a) and (b) have been achieved based on previous analysis; the EDE scheme will dispose of each key after use which is in line with the requirement (d).
Requirement (c) is to make sure that each key will not be re-used. Traditional OTPs use a small note pad to print a large set of random keys, and use a new key in each operation. In the computing era, this rule requires the storage of a large number of random keys, checking whether a key is used or not before, e.g. OTPs applied in quantum [17] or optical scattering [18] based cryptography. However, this is not practical in the IMD system because of normally scarce resources, such as limited memory, as the IMD is implanted in the patient's body. Thus we do not require the IMD to save all keys for verification purposes.
The randomness of generated ECG binary strings guarantees that the use of same keys would hardly happen. Considering the error correction capability of the ECC, e.g. BCHcode(n, m, t), two BSs with Hamming distance t could be regarded as the same key as they have the ability to decrypt each other's ciphertext. The OTP key length is equal to the code length n. As bits in the key are purely random according to NIST tests, the probability of a similar key being generated as before can be modeled as an (n − t)-fold Bernoulli trial with probability p = 0.5, denoted by B(n, p). So, the success probability of generating the same or similar key can be calculated by,
For a BCH code(127,64,10) the success probability is 1.23 × 10 −24 , which is negligible and could be assumed as zero in a practical test. Therefore we can assure that keys in the EDE scheme will not be re-used. So, adversaries cannot obtain any sensitive information to attack the scheme using statistical analysis or pattern matching. Consequently, all the requirements of OTP keys are fulfilled in the EDE.
B. SCHEME SECURITY 1) PERFECT SECRECY
The EDE scheme inherits the property of perfect secrecy from OTPs. For a secret message s with a priori probability P(s), a posteriori probability, P(s|c), of the secret if cryptogram c is intercepted can be denoted by Bayes's theorem as,
in which P(c) is the probability of obtaining cryptogram c, and P(c|s) is the conditional probability of c when the secret s is chosen. According to definition by Shannon [16] , perfect secrecy is that a posteriori probability is equal to a priori probability independently of all values. So, intercepting the cryptogram gives no information to adversaries. In this scheme, it is required that P(s|c) = P(s). As P(s) = 0, it is also required that P(c|s) = P(c). In the EDE scheme, one OTP key is used for one encryption only and the keys are purely random by the NIST test. Furthermore, although the ECC is employed in the scheme, the analysis using Eq. 4 shows the probability of generating two close keys with the number of error bits within the ECC error correcting capability t is negligible; thus the probability of c given the secret s is equal to the probability of obtaining c in any case, which means P(c|s) = P(c). In the EDE protocol design, a one way hash function is used to check message integrity and correctness of decrypted message, and the digests (hash values) could be intercepted by adversaries in the public channel. However, since the adversary could barely invert the digest to obtain the message, this intercepted digest would not compromise the message secrecy as long as the length of the digest is no less than the message length, such as choosing SHA-1 for a 128-bit message. The preimage attack is hard to launch here considering the length of the digest and the length of inputs of the hash function, including id imd , nonce, c i , s i . Therefore the EDE scheme has the property of perfect secrecy. In contrast to conventional symmetric encryption, perfect secrecy makes the scheme immune even to brute-force attacks. For secret messages {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , · · · }, the encrypted
As keys are purely random, guessing a secret in M c (e.g. s 1 ) requires trying all possible keys. Even if the adversary obtains s 1 and k a1 , it cannot gain any information about the key needed to decrypt other secrets in M c due to key randomness. 
2) PROTOCOL SECURITY
The EDE scheme has the ability to protect IMDs from eavesdropping. The active adversaries which aim at obtaining data from IMDs can also be prevented due to data encryption. Compared to traditional OTPs, our proposed scheme has additional features as highlighted below. (a) This scheme provides hash values to verify message integrity and the correctness of decrypted secrets. Any modification of the message would be detected by the programmer as the modified message cannot verify the hash value. (b) The device ID, ID pro , indicates which device the IMD intends to communicate with; the nonce maintains freshness of each session, and prevents potential replay attacks.
VII. RELATED WORK
Halperin et al. [2] first discussed that designing an IMD security scheme without compromising patient health must balance security and privacy goals with traditional goals such as safety and utility, allowing the IMD to be made accessible by medical personnel in emergencies. In order to achieve this balance, several schemes have been proposed, as listed in TABLE 2. Supporting access to IMDs under an emergency scenario is a necessary requirement for the IMD security.
The first two listed schemes in TABLE 2 design control access to the IMD using different techniques: ultrasonic distance bounding-based [15] and biometric-based (e.g. iris, fingerprint) access control [11] . The ultrasonic distance bounding-based security protocol ensures that anyone in the IMD's close proximity can access it in emergencies while the biometric-based scheme allows access to the IMD by matching biometric features. Considering that the algorithm of extracting features from iris or fingerprints is complicated, the biometric-based scheme is not feasible for a lightweight IMD. The following two schemes use an external device, a jammer-cum-receiver [24] and a gateway [3] , [10] respectively, to do authentication for the IMD; in medical emergencies, doctors can simply turn off or remover the external security device to gain access to the IMD. However, the disadvantage of using an external device is that, if this device is broken, lost or forgotten, the whole security system would fail.
For the H2H scheme [12] in TABLE 2, two ECG BSs are generated by the IMD and the programmer respectively for authentication; however, as described in [12] , a secure channel has to be set up using public-key cryptography which is time and resource consuming for the lightweight IMD and is therefore unrealistic. Compared with the H2H, our EDE scheme can perform secure communication directly without requiring a secure channel to be set up beforehand. The sixth type of schemes in TABLE 2 (PSKA [21] and OPFKA [19] ) propose an ECG-based key distribution protocol for a wireless body area network in which a symmetric key is embedded into the coefficients of a polynomial before transmission; since a high degree polynomial has to be calculated and reconstructed, this kind of a scheme would consume plenty of resources of the lightweight IMD. Discussions of applying the ECG-based key distribution into IMDs could be found in our previous work [13] , [14] . Compared to those schemes, encryption keys in our EDE scheme are directly generated from ECG signals. Thus our scheme does not require a cryptographic infrastructure to support key pre-distribution, storage, revocation and refreshment. Our EDE scheme even has an ability to resist brute-force attacks due to inheriting the property of perfect secrecy from classic OTPs.
In summary, none of the above approaches could provide proper security solutions for IMDs. According to analysis in [23] , data harvesting via eavesdropping or other attacks are one of the main concerns of IMD security; therefore we have designed the EDE scheme which could provide informationtheoretically secure encryption algorithm in practice for the IMD system.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented an information-theoretically secure encryption method for IMDs, namely the ECG-based Data Encryption (EDE). The EDE combines two well-known techniques of One-Time Pads and Error Correcting Codes to achieve a cryptographic primitive for IMDs. In emergencies, medical personnel can gain access to patients' IMDs by measuring the patients' real-time ECG signals while adversaries cannot do it due to the lack of real-time ECG data; thus the designed EDE scheme achieves the balance of high security and high accessibility (in emergencies).
The EDE scheme uses physiological (ECG) signal-based OTPs to encrypt secret data from IMDs before transmission. OTP keys are to be generated by each device from synchronously measured ECG signals, respectively. As ECG signals are used as natural random input into the encryption algorithm, there is no need of a cryptographic infrastructure to support key distribution, storage, revocation and refreshment. We analyzed the performance of the scheme by using MIT PhysioBank ECG data, which showed that the EDE is a viable approach to secure IMDs from eavesdropper and active adversaries. The security analysis showed that the EDE scheme fulfills the requirements of OTP key management, and thus inherits the property of perfect secrecy from OTPs. Future work includes a game-based security proof and an in-field study of the EDE scheme to better understand the properties of the generated ECG BSs and evaluate the performance of the scheme. 
